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REEVALUATING RECANTING WITNESSES: 
WHY THE RED-HEADED STEPCHILD OF 
NEW EVIDENCE DESERVES  
ANOTHER LOOK 
Shawn Armbrust* 
Abstract: Courts have generally disfavored evidence from recanting wit-
nesses. This article examines the standards laid out in Berry v. State and 
Larrison v. United States that courts use when considering motions for new 
trials based on new evidence. It next explores some of the reasons courts 
have disfavored recantations. Recent cases involving DNA exonerations 
present useful lessons for evaluating recantations and weaken many of the 
reasons courts have used to reject such evidence. Because DNA evidence 
is not readily available in most cases, however, the current framework has 
led to incarceration of innocent defendants. Given these lessons, courts 
must find new means of assessing the testimony of recanting witnesses. 
Courts should adopt a modified version of the Larrison standard, which 
would require corroboration rather than proof of truth. Appellate courts 
should not apply a deferential standard of review to summary denial of 
motions for new trials based on recantations. 
Introduction 
 On July 9, 1977, police found Cathleen Crowell Webb walking 
near a Homewood, Illinois park.1 When the bleeding, crying, and di-
sheveled sixteen-year-old told police she had been kidnapped by three 
men and raped in their car, they had every reason to believe her.2 Her 
story became even more convincing when she was examined at a local 
hospital, where doctors found vaginal trauma and carvings on her ab-
                                                                                                                      
* Executive Director, Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project. J.D., Georgetown University Law 
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giving me the freedom to write it. I also would like to thank Tim Sparapani for his patient 
assistance and support. 
1 Scott Kraft, Nation Debates Jailed Man’s Innocence: Recantation Puts Rape Case in Spotlight, 
L.A. Times, Apr. 21, 1985, § 1, at 1; David Remnick, Making Right Her Wrong: Cathy Webb’s 
Public Mission After Recanting the Rape Tale, Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1985, at B1. 
2 See Kraft, supra note 1. 
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domen.3 After vividly describing the attack to police and looking 
through hundreds of mug shots, she identified her attacker as Gary 
Dotson, a high-school dropout with a criminal record.4 Although Dot-
son adamantly protested his innocence, he was convicted in 1979 and 
sentenced to twenty-five to fifty years in prison.5 
 Webb ultimately married and moved to New Hampshire, becom-
ing a born-again Christian.6 That conversion prompted her to recant 
her testimony, admitting that she had fabricated the rape story because 
she feared that she was pregnant.7 Dotson immediately requested a new 
trial and received an evidentiary hearing, but the judge ultimately 
found that Webb’s trial testimony was more credible than her recanta-
tion.8 The ensuing drama became the intense focus of the media, with 
newspapers, magazines and morning television shows profiling the case 
and engaging in a national debate on the way courts treat recanting 
testimony.9 Dotson ultimately was paroled—although not pardoned— 
after the Illinois governor personally presided over a televised hearing 
on Dotson’s clemency request.10 
 Dotson did not stop trying to prove his innocence, however, and, 
in 1989, he became the first person in the United States to be exoner-
                                                                                                                      
3 Id. 
4 Id.; see also Kevin Klose, Illinois Governor Questions Dotson, Webb: ‘Extraordinary’ Rape 
Case Attracts Wide Audience, Wash. Post, May 10, 1985, at A3 (noting Dotson had several 
encounters with police prior to his arrest for Webb’s rape). 
5 People v. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d 718, 719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); Jim Dwyer et al., Ac-
tual Innocence 39–40 (2000); Alan Dershowitz, Our System of Justice Does Make Mistakes, 
St. Petersburg Times (Florida), Aug. 19, 1989, at 19A. 
6 Kraft, supra note 1. 
7 Id. 
8 See Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 718–19, 721–22 (affirming trial court’s finding that Webb’s 
1979 trial testimony was more credible than her 1985 evidentiary hearing testimony). 
9 See, e.g., Laurent Belsie, Recanted Testimony: Issue Tests Criminal-Justice Credibility, Chris-
tian Sci. Monitor, Apr. 19, 1985, at 5 (discussing the debate among law professors and 
women’s groups that was provoked by the recantation in the Dotson case); Peter W. Kaplan, 
NBC, at No. 1, Snaps 10-Year Ratings Decline, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1985, at 46 (explaining that 
CBS interrupted its live coverage of the Claus von Bülow trial to show the Dotson rape hear-
ings); Kraft, supra note 1 (relaying that Webb apologized to Dotson’s mother on national 
television and that a Senate subcommittee was holding hearings on the way courts treat re-
canted testimony); Remnick, supra note 1 (discussing Webb’s public campaign to secure 
Dotson’s exoneration by appearing on morning shows, in People magazine, and on the Phil 
Donahue show). The Dotson case was also the focus of legal scholarship; some authors ar-
gued, based in part on the Dotson case, that courts should reevaluate the way they treat re-
canting witnesses. See, e.g., Janice J. Repka, Comment, Rethinking the Standard for New Trial 
Motions Based upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1433, 1454–58 
(1986) (arguing for a more relaxed “reasonable probability approach” for judging the credi-
bility of recantations). 
10 New Trial Denied in Rape in Which Accuser Recanted, L.A. Times, Aug. 20, 1985, at A7. 
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ated based on DNA testing, proving conclusively that Webb’s recanta-
tion was true.11 Since that time, more than 200 innocent prisoners have 
been exonerated based on DNA testing, and these ever-increasing 
numbers have sensitized the public and policymakers as never before to 
the problems in the criminal justice system.12 These exonerations have 
conclusively proven that much of the evidence frequently relied upon 
by courts—such as informant testimony, accomplice testimony, eyewit-
ness testimony, and confessions—are more unreliable than anyone ever 
realized.13 Moreover, the study of DNA exonerations has led to tre-
mendous reforms all over the country, such as the improvement of 
eyewitness identification procedures, the videotaping of police interro-
gations, crime lab reform, and the creation of “innocence commis-
sions” that recommend reforms in individual states.14 In addition to 
reforms that would prevent wrongful convictions, at least forty-two 
states have laws that allow prisoners to seek post-conviction DNA testing 
that would help prove their innocence.15 Indeed, it would not be an 
exaggeration to say that these exonerations have had a greater impact 
on criminal justice policy than any other event in recent American his-
tory. 
 As other commentators have observed, however, the reforms that 
have focused on correcting wrongful convictions have focused almost 
exclusively on cases involving DNA evidence.16 Unfortunately, DNA evi-
                                                                                                                      
11 Dwyer et al., supra note 5, at 39–40. 
12 Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, http://www.innocenceproject. 
org/about/Mission-Statement.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
13 See generally Dwyer et al., supra note 5, (chronicling the stories of wrongly con-
victed individuals who were eventually exonerated by DNA evidence). 
14 See  S.B. 351, 423d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2007) (providing for the regulation 
of state crime labs); Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/415. 
php (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) (listing North Carolina, Wisconsin, California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, and Pennsylvania as states that have each created commissions to study the prob-
lem of wrongful convictions and recommend state reforms); Innocence Project, Fix the 
System: Priority Issues: Eyewitness Identification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/ 
Eyewitness-Identification.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2008) (providing a list of jurisdictions that 
have implemented eyewitness identification reforms, either through the legislature, the 
courts, or other means). See generally Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations: Everybody Wins, 95 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1127, 1131 (2005) (listing the 
jurisdictions that require the recordation of custodial interrogations as a means of safe-
guarding against false confessions). 
15 Innocence Project, Fix the System: Priority Issues: DNA Testing Access, http://www. 
innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
16 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Up the River Without a Procedure: Innocent Prisoners and 
Newly Discovered Non-DNA Evidence in State Courts, 47 Ariz. L. Rev. 655, 715–18 (2005) (ex-
amining state procedures for prisoners with newly discovered non-DNA evidence of inno-
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dence is unavailable in the vast majority of cases, either because there 
was no biological evidence present at the initial crime scene, because 
evidence initially available has been lost or destroyed, or because evi-
dence that has been saved is no longer viable for testing because it is 
too degraded.17 Moreover, because DNA tests are now more widely 
available before trial, the pool of cases in which post-conviction DNA 
testing is available inevitably will shrink.18 Thus, it will be increasingly 
important in the future to provide improved post-conviction mecha-
nisms for prisoners who have newly discovered non-biological evidence 
of innocence, such as “confessions by the actual perpetrator, statements 
by previously unknown witnesses, and/or recantations by [key] trial 
participants.”19 
 There are significant roadblocks for any defendant with newly 
discovered non-DNA evidence of innocence. The type of evidence 
most emphatically disfavored by courts, however, is the kind proven 
reliable when Gary Dotson was exonerated: the recantation of key 
witnesses like Webb.20 It is fair to say that courts are almost uniformly 
skeptical of recanting witnesses, and the predominant view still seems 
to be the one espoused by the Court of Appeals of New York in 1916: 
“There is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony. In 
the popular mind it is often regarded as of great importance. Those 
experienced in the administration of the criminal law know well its 
untrustworthy character.”21 It is undoubtedly true that concerns about 
recanting witnesses—witnesses who have lied on at least one occa-
                                                                                                                      
cence and offering suggestions for making those procedures more equitable for innocent 
defendants). 
17 See Protecting the Innocent: Proposals to Reform the Death Penalty: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 221 (2002) (statement of Professor Barry Scheck, Co-
Director of the Innocence Project and Member of New York State’s Forensic Science Re-
view Board) (estimating that approximately eighty percent of felony cases do not involve 
biological evidence amenable to DNA testing); Nina Martin, Innocence Lost, S.F. Mag., Nov. 
2004, at 78, 105 (“only about ten percent of criminal cases have any biological evidence”). 
18 Medwed, supra note 16, at 657. 
19 See id. at 658. 
20 See Repka, supra note 9, at 1434 (defining a recantation as “a formal, intentional re-
nunciation by a witness of her former testimony”). 
21 People v. Shilitano, 112 N.E. 733, 736 (N.Y. 1916) (finding witness’ recantation in-
credible and denying defendant’s motion to grant a new trial); see Sharon Cobb, Com-
ment, Gary Dotson as Victim: The Legal Response to Recanting Testimony, 35 Emory L.J. 969, 981 
(1986). A Lexis search of the phrase “there is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting 
testimony” found thirty-four hits between the time of Dotson’s release and September 27, 
2007. http://www.lexis.com (in MEGA database, type in terms and connectors search: 
“there is no form of proof so unreliable as recanting testimony,” and restrict date from 
8/15/1989 to 9/27/2007). 
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sion—are valid, and some recantations clearly lack any specificity or 
indicia of reliability.22 While some of this skepticism is fair, such a 
blanket mistrust of recantations seems outdated in the era of DNA 
exonerations, when we know that testifying under oath does not al-
ways produce the most reliable information.23 
 This article argues that the longstanding skepticism of the judici-
ary toward recantations deserves reexamination; some DNA exonera-
tions have proven the unreliability of certain forms of testimony and 
the reliability of certain recanting witnesses. Part I of this article ex-
amines the standards used when courts consider recantations as newly 
discovered evidence in a motion for a new trial. Part II examines some 
of the reasons why courts are strongly skeptical of recantations. Part 
III examines the lessons of DNA exonerations and explains why some 
of those lessons undercut most of the reasons why courts have tradi-
tionally disfavored recantations. Part IV proposes a new framework for 
evaluating recantations, which more effectively balances the concerns 
of Part II with the new realities discussed in Part III. The new frame-
work calls on courts to abandon requirements of truthfulness in favor 
of a more relaxed corroboration standard, and proposes that courts 
eliminate deferential standards of review when new trial motions are 
summarily dismissed. 
I. Standards for Considering Recantations 
 People both inside and outside the legal system frequently pre-
sume that the post-conviction and appellate processes in criminal 
cases are well suited to the task of rooting out wrongful convictions. 
This opinion, however, ignores the reality that appellate and post-
conviction procedures are almost exclusively focused on correcting 
                                                                                                                      
22 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 982 (“When a witness substantially recants his or her pre-
vious testimony, it is immediately apparent that on one occasion or the other, he or she 
told something other than the truth.”). In my current capacity, I have seen recantations 
that are extremely incredible, such as letters saying “I’m sorry I lied about you,” and con-
taining no other indications of why someone might have lied. I, however, also have seen 
recantations that seem quite credible, such as repeated public statements explaining ex-
actly why a witness lied at trial, for reasons ranging from police pressure to malice toward 
the defendant. It is easy to see why courts would be reluctant to grant new trials in the 
former cases, but recantations, as any other type of evidence, can vary considerably in reli-
ability. 
23 See, e.g., Dwyer et al., supra note 5, 142–43, 153 (detailing the witness testimonies 
implicating Ron Williamson for murder and rape and his post-conviction exoneration 
through DNA evidence). I do not intend to suggest that most testimony elicited at trial is 
unreliable. Rather, my intention is to indicate that testimony elicited at trial is not always 
more reliable than a recanting statement, as courts and judges seem to assume. 
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legal and constitutional errors, not on correcting factual errors.24 The 
presumption of innocence that cloaks criminal defendants no longer 
exists after a defendant is convicted, and the burden of proving inno-
cence after conviction is therefore tremendous.25 In addition, courts 
are skeptical of newly discovered evidence claims because they are 
concerned about finality, believe firmly in the jury’s ability to make 
factual determinations, and have inherent doubts about the validity of 
evidence that is discovered after trial.26 
 Despite these obstacles, there are procedures in state courts for 
prisoners who want to bring forward new evidence of innocence.27 The 
primary vehicle for a defendant with newly discovered evidence of in-
nocence is a motion for a new trial.28 In some states, newly discovered 
evidence also can be brought to a court’s attention through collateral 
attack proceedings.29 This article focuses primarily on motions for a 
new trial because they are the primary vehicle for litigating newly dis-
covered evidence claims and are conceptually similar to collateral at-
tack proceedings and, therefore, can be treated similarly.30 States con-
sidering newly discovered innocence claims primarily use or have 
adopted one of two standards: the Berry standard or the Larrison stan-
dard, with some states offering adaptations outside those schemes.31 
                                                                                                                      
24 See Medwed, supra note 16, at 664. 
25 See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326 n.42 (1995) (stating that convicted defendants 
“no longer ha[ve]the benefit of the presumption of innocence” but instead face a strong 
presumption of guilt). 
26 Medwed, supra note 16, at 664–65. 
27 See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 410–11 (1993); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., State 
Postconviction Remedies and Relief § 1-13, at 55–58 (2001). The primary vehicle for 
challenging state convictions in federal courts is habeas corpus, which exists to remedy 
constitutional violations and therefore is not available for claims of newly discovered evi-
dence. Nicholas Berg, Note, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. 
Collins, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 121, 121 (2005). 
28 See Medwed, supra note 16, at 665 (noting that “every state provides for a motion for 
new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence”). 
29 See Wilkes, supra note 27, §§ 1-3 to 1-5, at 13–30. 
30 Medwed, supra note 16, at 665–66; see Larry W. Yackle, Postconviction Remedies 
31 (1981) (explaining that collateral attacks that mirror a writ of coram nobis are similar 
to motions for a new trial). “Coram nobis is an ancient common-law writ that provides a 
means of collateral attack in criminal cases where some event outside the trial record has 
rendered a conviction fundamentally flawed.” Daniel F. Piar, Using Coram Nobis to Attack 
Wrongful Convictions: A New Look at an Ancient Writ, 30 N. Ky. L. Rev. 505, 505 (2003). 
31 Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928); Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511 
(1851); Tim A. Thomas, Annotation, Standard for Granting or Denying New Trial in State 
Criminal Case on Basis of Recanted Testimony—Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R. 4th 1031, 1037–50 
(1990 & Supp. 2007). As is the case with any statement making a generalization about the 
fifty states, the tests they employ vary widely. See Thomas, supra, at 1037–50. That being 
said, most of them use Berry, Larrison, or some adaptation of the two. Id. A few jurisdic-
 
2008] Reevaluating Recanting Witnesses 81 
 Most state courts considering a motion for a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence use the standard articulated by the Georgia 
Supreme Court in Berry v. State.32 Under Berry, a new trial based on 
newly discovered evidence should only be granted if the defendant 
proves that: (1) the evidence has come to his knowledge since the trial, 
(2) the failure to discover the evidence was not because of a lack of 
diligence, (3) the evidence is so material that it would probably pro-
duce a different verdict if a new trial were granted, (4) the evidence is 
not merely cumulative, and (5) the evidence does not simply impeach a 
witness’ credibility.33 The test was not developed in the context of re-
cantations and therefore is applied to other types of newly discovered 
evidence.34 
 Unlike the Berry standard, the other predominant standard for 
courts considering new recantation evidence specifically considers the 
issue of granting new trials based on witness recantations. In Larrison 
v. United States, the court found that, 
a new trial should be granted [based on a recanting witness] 
when, (a) The court is reasonably well satisfied that the testi-
mony given by a material witness is false. (b) That without it 
the jury might have reached a different conclusion. (c) That 
the party seeking the new trial was taken by surprise when the 
false testimony was given and was unable to meet it or did not 
know of its falsity until after the trial.35 
 The Larrison test initially was perceived as being more lenient 
than the Berry test because it has a lower standard of materiality, but 
commentators have argued that these differences are largely illu-
sory.36 The primary difference between the two tests is that a defen-
dant using the Larrison test is only required to prove that the new evi-
dence might result in a different verdict, whereas a defendant using 
                                                                                                                      
tions, however, have developed different standards, requiring defendants to prove the 
credibility of the recantation, the materiality of the recantation, or bring forward corrobo-
rating evidence. Id. at 1048–50, 1052, 1054–55. For purposes of simplicity, this article only 
addresses the Berry and Larrison standards. 
32 Berry, 10 Ga. at 527; Cobb, supra note 21, at 974. 
33 Berry, 10 Ga. at 527. 
34 Cobb, supra note 21, at 974–75. 
35 Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87–88. 
36 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 976; see also Repka, supra note 9, at 1439 (“Regardless of 
which standard is used, however, nearly all new trial motions based on unknowing use of 
perjured testimony are routinely denied by the courts because both standards impose an 
excessive burden on the defendant.”). 
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the Berry test must prove that it probably would result in a different 
verdict.37 The more lenient materiality requirement of the Larrison 
test, however, is mitigated by requiring that the judge be persuaded of 
the recantation’s truthfulness.38 Thus, in practice, which test is ap-
plied makes very little difference in the outcome of the case.39 
II. Reasons Why Courts Disfavor Recantations 
 As discussed above, whether a court uses the Berry or Larrison stan-
dard makes very little practical difference in the outcome of a case, in 
part because the standards are not as different as they appear. The 
more significant reason there is so little difference, however, is the in-
herent skepticism most courts have toward recantations.40 Courts usu-
ally approach recantations with a presumption that they are incredible, 
which means that any defendant pursuing a new trial based on a recan-
tation is facing an uphill battle.41 Indeed, this reasoning often reflects 
legitimate trepidation about pieces of evidence whose credibility is ex-
tremely difficult to assess. Thus, it is important to understand and con-
sider these reasons in any attempt to fashion a new standard for evalu-
ating recantations. 
 This section explores some of the reasons—both stated and un-
stated—for this inherent mistrust of recantations, and isolates seven 
reasons why courts often find recantations to be unreliable: (1) the 
perception that any witness who recants is untrustworthy, (2) determi-
nations about the demeanor of the witness during an evidentiary hear-
ing, (3) findings that the other evidence in the case supports the initial 
guilty verdict, (4) fears that the witness has recanted under duress or 
because of coercion, (5) close relationships between defendants and 
witnesses, (6) a desire for finality and concerns about judicial economy, 
and (7) the desire to prevent the manipulation of courts. 
                                                                                                                      
37 Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88–89; Berry, 10 Ga. at 527; Cobb, supra note 21, at 976. 
38 Larrison, 24 F.2d at 88–89; Cobb, supra note 21, at 978. 
39 Cobb, supra note 21, at 978. 
40 See Christopher J. Sinnott, Note, When a Defendant Becomes the Victim: A Child’s Recan-
tation as Newly Discovered Evidence, 41 Clev. St. L. Rev. 569, 574–75 (1993) ( Judicial skepti-
cism toward recantations “has become so universal that it appears to have given rise to an 
inference that recantation evidence is not trustworthy and should be treated as such ab-
sent the movant’s ability to persuade otherwise.”). 
41 See Repka, supra note 9, at 1442 (“Although courts are not required to presume the 
untrustworthiness of recantation testimony, the long-standing rule that such testimony is 
suspect and inherently unreliable ultimately produces the same effect.”). 
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A. General Mistrust of Recanting Witnesses 
 The first reason why courts are reluctant to grant new trials in 
recantation cases is simply that they mistrust recanting witnesses. Any 
defendant seeking a new trial based on the testimony of a recanting 
witness has one immediate and significant hurdle: the defendant is 
hanging his or her hat on a witness who has either lied under oath or 
who is wasting a court’s time by lying after trial.42 As a result, judges 
have significant problems deciding which version of a story to be-
lieve.43 Thus, courts often interpret recantations as evidence of the 
unreliability of the witness, not the accuracy of the new testimony.44 
Under Berry, such testimony could be classified as immaterial, and 
under Larrison, many courts would find that challenging credibility 
does not prove the falsity of the trial testimony.45 Thus immediate dis-
trust of recanting witnesses—before even hearing their testimony— 
can make it impossible to satisfy either test. 
B. Specific Judgments About Witness Demeanor 
 The second reason courts disfavor recanting witnesses is because 
judges frequently find a witness’ demeanor at evidentiary hearings to 
be characteristic of someone who is lying. In most claims involving 
new evidence, the initial trial court holds the evidentiary hearing in 
the case.46 Thus, the trial court is able to compare the demeanor of 
the witness when he or she testified at trial to the demeanor of the 
                                                                                                                      
42 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 982 (“When a witness substantially recants his or her pre-
vious testimony, it is immediately apparent that on one occasion or the other, he or she 
told something other than the truth.”). 
43 See, e.g., Carpitcher v. Commonwealth, 641 S.E.2d 486, 489–90 (Va. 2007) (noting 
that the trial court was unable to determine which version of the witness’ testimony was 
true, because the witness had “testified inconsistently on the same issues on three separate 
occasions”). 
44 See, e.g., People v. Canter, 496 N.W.2d 336, 341–42 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (per cu-
riam) (“Contrary to defendant’s contentions, neither the veracity of [the witness’] recant-
ing testimony nor the falsity of her trial testimony has clearly been established.”); State v. 
Perry, 758 P.2d 268, 275 (Mont. 1988) (stating that “recanted testimony demonstrates the 
unreliability of a witness”); Carpitcher, 641 S.E.2d at 489–90. 
45 See Carpitcher, 641 S.E.2d at 493 (holding that recantation was not material to the is-
sue of actual innocence because defendant could not prove the recantation was true). See 
generally Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir. 1928); Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 
(1851). 
46 Medwed, supra note 16, at 699. 
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same witness at an evidentiary hearing.47 In many cases, the trial court 
simply determines that the witness’ testimony at trial was simply more 
convincing than the testimony at the hearing because of the witness’ 
demeanor.48 For example, in State v. Berry, the trial court found that 
the recanting witness was unbelievable because he “had been ‘some-
what spirited’ at trial” but had a “‘completely flat’” affect at the evi-
dentiary hearing.49 In People v. Dotson, the trial court found “[the vic-
tim’s] demeanor was consistent with a person making a sincere claim 
of rape,” and found that her memory lapses about certain details at 
the evidentiary hearing made her seem less credible.50 Thus, courts 
often find the evidentiary hearing testimony to be less credible than 
the original trial testimony because they are influenced by observa-
tions regarding witness demeanor. 
C. Evaluations of the Other Evidence in the Case 
 The third reason judges tend to dismiss motions for new trials 
based on recantation evidence is that they often find the recantation 
to be outweighed by other evidence introduced at the trial. Under 
both the Berry and Larrison standards, the judge must pay varying de-
grees of attention to the chances of a different jury verdict in the 
event of a retrial.51 It therefore makes sense that judges would evalu-
ate the recantation in the context of the other evidence produced at 
trial, and that frequently is the basis for dismissing the credibility of 
recantations.52 For example, in State v. Perry, the court found that the 
recanting witness’ testimony was implausible in part because it con-
tradicted the testimony of other witnesses who testified at trial.53 
Thus, when a court evaluates a recantation in context, it often may 
                                                                                                                      
47 See People v. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987); State v. Berry, No. 01-
3359, 2003 WL 735088, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2003) (not to be confused with Berry v. 
State which is discussed in the text accompanying notes 37–41). 
48 See, e.g., Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 721; State v. Berry, 2003 WL 735088, at *3. 
49 2003 WL 735088, at *3. 
50 516 N.E.2d at 721. 
51 See Larrison, 24 F.2d at 87–88; Berry, 10 Ga. at 527. 
52 See, e.g., Perry, 758 P.2d at 275 (finding witness’ recantation did not “conform to the 
testimony of the other witnesses, the evidence presented at trial, the [defendant’s] prior 
statements; nor [did] it account for [the defendant’s] whereabouts at the time of the mur-
der”). 
53 Id. at 273; see also Ashcraft v. State, 918 S.W.2d 648, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) 
(finding that medical testimony at trial supported the recanting witness’ trial testimony, 
not her recantation); State v. Cason, No. 01-0809, 2002 WL 109545, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. 
Mar. 19, 2002) (per curiam) (finding that the recantation contradicted the physical evi-
dence admitted at trial). 
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find that the recanting testimony simply is not supported by the other 
evidence that was introduced at trial. 
D. Fears of Duress or Coercion 
 The fourth reason for judicial mistrust is the fear that such recan-
tations are the product of duress or coercion.54 Some of this apprehen-
sion has its roots in an unfortunate—and highly publicized—reality of 
our judicial system, that witnesses often are threatened or coerced be-
fore trials, particularly in gang and domestic violence cases.55 This co-
ercion can come from defendants, their families, or their friends, so 
judges often assume coercion even when a defendant is incarcerated.56 
This significant problem undoubtedly has created a system in which 
judges are hyper-aware of the possibility for duress and coercion, some-
thing that almost certainly carries over to situations in which witnesses 
recant after trial.57 Moreover, prosecutors who sponsored witnesses at 
trial often respond to recantations by looking for evidence of coercion, 
not necessarily because they are looking to thwart justice but because 
they believed in the initial testimony of the witnesses and have had simi-
lar experiences with duress and coercion.58 Thus, any recantation may 
be met with the assumption that it was the product of duress or coercion 
because judges are aware of such tactics and are trained to look for it. 
E. Close Relationships Between Defendants and Witnesses 
 A fifth factor that leads to judges’ skepticism toward recantations is 
the relationships that often exist between defendants and witnesses. 
Defendants often have preexisting relationships with the witnesses who 
                                                                                                                      
54 Cobb, supra note 21, at 983–85. 
55 See Nora V. Demleitner, Witness Protection in Criminal Cases: Anonymity, Disguise or 
Other Options?, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. Supp. 641, 644–45 (1998) (discussing the increasing 
publicity given to witness intimidation in domestic abuse and gang-related cases); Kelly 
Rutan, Comment, Procuring the Right to an Unfair Trial: Federal Rule of Evidence 804(B)(6) and 
the Due Process Implications of the Rule’s Failure to Require Standards of Reliability for Admissible 
Evidence, 56 Am. U. L. Rev. 177, 186 (2006) (discussing a 1995 Department of Justice study 
that revealed an increase in witness intimidation in the 1980s and 1990s). 
56 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 983–86, 987–89. 
57 See, e.g., State v. Elkins, No. 21380, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4037, at *9–14 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Aug. 27, 2003) (affirming trial court’s finding that child-victim’s recantation was “the 
result of influence from her family and others who have an interest in the success of [de-
fendant’s] petition”). 
58 See, e.g., Shannon Selden, The Practice of Domestic Violence, 12 UCLA Women’s L.J. 1, 
37–38 (2001) (discussing the tendency of domestic violence victims to recant their stories 
because of duress, coercion, and fear of retaliation). 
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testify against them in criminal trials, whether those witnesses are vic-
tims, co-defendants, or friends who are informants.59 Testifying against 
a friend or a relative undoubtedly is a difficult proposition, and unless 
there is a motive to lie, taking such a risk will be seen as an indicator of 
witness credibility. The flip side of that equation is also true: a witness 
who recants his or her testimony against a friend or loved one generally 
will be perceived as doing so because they want to help the defendant.60 
Thus, recantations in such cases often will be presumed incredible be-
cause there is a significant motive to help the defendant. 
F. Finality and Judicial Economy 
 The sixth reason why judges are reluctant to grant new trials in 
recantation cases is a general concern about finality and judicial econ-
omy; these concerns are common in all cases where defendants are 
seeking new trials.61 The judicial system understandably is apprehensive 
about the need to keep cases from continuing for years after an initial 
trial, both because of anxiety about victims and because a system in 
which criminal cases perpetuate for years is impractical.62 In addition, a 
judiciary that is consistently overburdened and underfunded is worried 
about granting new trials in too many cases, because of fears that they 
simply would not be able to handle the onslaught. 
G. Desire to Prevent Manipulation of Courts 
 The seventh reason why judges are skeptical of recanting wit-
nesses is their desire to prevent manipulation of the courts. As the 
Virginia Supreme Court observed in Carpitcher, “recantation evidence 
is generally questionable in character and is widely viewed by courts 
with suspicion because of the obvious opportunities and temptations 
                                                                                                                      
59 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 987–88. 
60 See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 111 P.3d 636, 651 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam). For ex-
ample, in Lewis v. State, the child victim recanted her trial testimony against her paternal 
uncle, the defendant. Id. at 640, 651. At the time of trial, the victim lived with her mother, 
but at the time of the recantation, she lived with her paternal grandmother (the defen-
dant’s mother). Id. at 650–51. There, the court found ample evidence that the victim’s 
loyalty to the defendant’s mother may have motivated her recantation. Id. at 651. 
61 Cobb, supra note 21, at 991. 
62 See Cynthia E. Jones, Evidence Destroyed, Innocence Lost: The Preservation of Biological 
Evidence Under Innocence Protection Statutes, 42 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1239, 1265–67 (2005) (ex-
plaining that government’s interest in finality of judgments stems from a desire to punish 
the guilty, and therefore to serve a deterrent function, and to provide closure to victims). 
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for fraud.”63 Like the other concerns of courts, these worries are not 
entirely misplaced. In one case, the court found the recanting witness 
was motivated to change his trial testimony because the defendant’s 
family paid him $300.64 Thus, courts frequently encounter situations 
in which defendants and their associates may legitimately be trying to 
manipulate the courts to obtain a favorable outcome. 
III. Lessons of DNA Exonerations 
 Despite all of these legitimate or understandable reasons for disfa-
voring recantations, the 200-plus DNA exonerations have provided 
sound bases to reevaluate the current treatment of recanting wit-
nesses.65 Before the advent of DNA evidence, the debate surrounding 
wrongful convictions often focused on whether wrongful convictions oc-
curred in significant numbers, not on the causes producing such a sys-
temic failure in the criminal justice system.66 Today, however, a plethora 
of scholars, non-profit organizations, and state commissions have fo-
cused extensively on how the criminal justice system can break down to 
produce a wrongful conviction.67 We therefore have greater insight 
than ever before into the types of evidence that are the least trustwor-
                                                                                                                      
63 641 S.E.2d at 492; see also State v. Soto, No. 03-3446, 2005 WL 524874, at *3 (Wis. Ct. 
App. Mar. 8, 2005) (quoting the trial court’s statement that a co-defendant’s recantation 
should be viewed with suspicion because “[c]o-defendants should not be able to pool their 
post-conviction resources and decide which one of them ought to get a new trial”). 
64 State v. Avery, No. 2005AP1447, 2006 WL 618839, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 
2006). 
65 See Innocence Project, About Us: Mission Statement, supra note 12 (indicating 207 
people have been exonerated through DNA testing). 
66 See, e.g., Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially 
Capital Cases, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 21, 23–24 (1987) (highlighting 350 erroneous convictions in 
“capital or potentially capital” cases in the twentieth century); Stephen J. Markman & Paul 
G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 121, 
121–22 (1988) (criticizing the methodology and conclusions of Bedau and Radelet’s study 
and claiming the actual number of wrongful convictions was much lower); see also Hugo 
Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, The Myth of Infallibility: A Reply to Markman & Cassell, 41 
Stan. L. Rev. 161 (1988) (replying to Markman and Cassell’s critique). The debate about 
the frequency and nature of wrongful convictions still exists today, but the focus of most 
wrongful convictions scholarship has shifted to addressing solutions to the problem, not 
whether a problem exists. See, e.g., Andrew M. Siegel, Moving Down the Wedge of Injustice: A 
Proposal for a Third Generation of Wrongful Convictions Scholarship and Advocacy, 42 Am. Crim. 
L. Rev. 1219, 1220 (2005) (noting wrongful convictions scholarship has more recently 
focused on “identify[ing] and publiciz[ing] the factors that lead to flawed evidence and 
faulty convictions”). 
67 See Dwyer et al., supra note 5, at 249; Innocence Project, Fix the System: Priority Issues: 
Innocence Commissions, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Innocence-Commissions.php 
(last visited Jan. 2, 2008). 
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thy and the ways in which that evidence and the criminal justice system 
can be made more trustworthy. 
 These lessons can be applied to the universe of recanting wit-
nesses as well. As discussed above, judges are likely to presume the 
unreliability of recanting witnesses, who most often are co-defendants, 
informants, or victims.68 They do this for some legitimate reasons, but 
even the legitimate ones are undercut when we apply what we have 
learned from the DNA exonerations. Those exonerations are rife with 
examples of witnesses who we now know lied at trial.69 Thus, the cir-
cumstances of those cases and the underlying motivations for some of 
those lies can provide valuable insight into the ways in which judges 
can and should evaluate such recantations. 
 This section examines four of those lessons: (1) all participants in 
the justice system, including judges, are subject to cognitive biases that 
call into question their ability to impartially analyze new evidence of 
innocence; (2) incentivizing witnesses creates strong motives to lie at 
trial; (3) defendants are not the only parties in the criminal justice sys-
tem who coerce false testimony out of witnesses; and (4) fact finders are 
not always the most accurate judges of witness credibility. Each of these 
lessons calls into question the general judicial mistrust of recanting 
witnesses, as well as the instinct to avoid granting new trials because of 
finality and judicial economy.70 Examined individually, these factors 
                                                                                                                      
68 See supra notes 45–70 and accompanying text. In very rare circumstances, eyewit-
nesses have recanted their testimony when presented with pictures of the real perpetrator 
or when confronted with problems in their testimony. See Mid-Atlantic Innocence Project, 
Mistaken Eyewitness Identifications, http://www.exonerate.org/facts/causes-of-wrongful-
convictions/mistaken-eyewitness-identifications/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2008). Such recanta-
tions are rare, however, because the vast majority of eyewitnesses are people who genuinely 
believe in the truth of their testimony. See id. This distinguishes them from the subset of 
recanting witnesses considered in this article, who have knowingly lied at trial. The same 
preconceptions are not as likely to apply to the testimony of eyewitnesses, because they are 
presented to the court as having made a mistake, not as someone who has lied at some 
point in their testimony. 
69 See generally Dwyer et al., supra note 5. 
70 See Cobb, supra note 21, at 991. The notions of finality and judicial economy are 
based at least in part on the premise that the panoply of protections provided to criminal 
defendants at trial adds sufficient guarantees of reliability to verdicts in criminal trials. See 
Jones, supra note at 62, at 1266 (highlighting the dual assumptions underlying the princi-
ple of finality of judgment: that the original trial resulted in a reliable verdict and that 
post-conviction litigation will be unlikely to change the outcome because the constitutional 
protections given to the accused drastically reduce the likelihood of an erroneous convic-
tion). DNA exonerations, however, call into question those notions, because they indicate 
that the system is not functioning as well as previously was believed. See Dwyer et al., su-
pra note 5, at 248–49 (citing a National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence Task 
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also call into question each of the other rationales judges rely upon 
when they explain their mistrust of recantations. 
A. Cognitive Biases Affect Judicial Decisions 
 In Gary Dotson’s case, the trial judge who presided over both 
Dotson’s trial and post-judgment relief hearing found that the victim’s 
recantation was implausible because her demeanor at trial was consis-
tent with someone who had been raped and because there was inde-
pendent evidence corroborating her trial testimony.71 The judge noted 
that the victim’s memory at the 1985 evidentiary hearing was not as 
sharp as her memory at the 1979 trial, which he interpreted as selective 
memory.72 The court did not find a conceivable motive—such as duress 
or a relationship with the defendant—for the victim to make up the 
recantation, but instead relied on her trial testimony and on the testi-
mony of investigating officers and her guardians, who believed her ini-
tial story of the attack.73 In making this determination, the judge ig-
nored significant inconsistencies between the victim’s initial statement 
and the evidence adduced at trial, deeming them inconsequential.74 Of 
course, DNA evidence ultimately proved that the victim’s recantation, 
and not her trial testimony, was the truth.75 The relatively weak justifica-
tions the trial judge used in his ruling make clear that he did not want 
to believe the victim’s recantation was true.76 He was too invested in the 
initial verdict to make an objective decision about the new evidence of 
innocence. 
 One of the most significant lessons that Dotson’s case and other 
DNA exonerations have taught us is that tunnel vision contributes 
                                                                                                                      
Force report issued in 1999 which stated, “[t]he strong presumption that verdicts are cor-
rect has been weakened” due to multiple DNA exonerations). 
71 People v. Dotson, 516 N.E.2d 718, 721 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987). 
72 Id. at 722 (finding that the victim testified once that she could not remember injur-
ing her vaginal area and once that she had not injured her vaginal area). 
73 See id. 
74 See id. at 720. The court found three specific instances of inconsistencies insignifi-
cant: (1) the victim said her slacks became muddy during the attack, but she said she was 
attacked in the car; (2) she testified at trial that she had scratched her attacker on the 
chest and behind the ear (where she felt her nails dig in), but there were no scratch marks 
anywhere on Dotson after his arrest; and (3) she testified at trial that she was a few inches 
from the attacker who tried to kiss her, but did not mention any facial hair, which Dotson 
had. Id. 
75 Dershowitz, supra note 5. 
76 See Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 721–22. 
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significantly to the problem of wrongful convictions.77 Tunnel vision is 
a natural human tendency that causes judges (and other actors in the 
criminal justice system) “to focus on a particular conclusion and then 
filter all evidence in a case through the lens provided by that conclu-
sion.”78 In his examination of cognitive biases among judges, Daniel 
Medwed ultimately concluded that post-conviction petitions and mo-
tions for new trials should not be directed to trial judges, in part be-
cause of the cognitive biases that infect their decision-making.79 While 
this article does not directly tackle the problem of cognitive bias, 
Medwed’s arguments go a long way toward explaining why judges are 
likely to discount recantations (and other new evidence of innocence) 
without fully considering the import of that evidence. 
 Medwed identified two significant cognitive biases that are relevant 
in cases where new evidence of innocence is being offered.80 First, the 
prospect of a wrongful conviction is anathema to most judges, who see 
themselves as fair and competent individuals.81 As a result, they do not 
believe that their decisions could have allowed such an injustice to take 
place and are reluctant to find credible any evidence that would suggest 
otherwise.82 Second, the problem of “status quo bias” means that “peo-
ple often have difficulty deviating from a prior decision because that 
decision has become the reference point to which they compare and 
contrast newfound information.”83 Thus judges revisiting a case in 
which they already have presided are likely to require a defendant to 
prove much more about his or her innocence than would be required 
if the judge were examining a new case.84 The net result of both cogni-
tive biases is that judges are likely to find grounds to discount new evi-
dence of innocence because that evidence does not fit with their no-
tions of themselves or of the case at hand.85 
 This problem is particularly acute when it is examined in the con-
text of recantations. As demonstrated in Part II, there are several sig-
nificant and understandable reasons why judges often disfavor recanta-
                                                                                                                      
77 See Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 291, 292. 
78 Id. at 292. 
79 See Medwed, supra note 16, at 700–08. 
80 Id. 
81 See id. at 701 (discussing the problem of egocentric bias in which individuals develop 
a positive and often over-inflated image of their own abilities). 
82 See id. 
83 Id. at 701–02. 
84 Medwed, supra note 16, at 701–02. 
85 See id. 
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tions.86 Unfortunately, several of them allow judges to make subjective 
judgments about statements, evidence, and credibility, as the judge did 
in the Dotson case.87 While this is well within the rights of a judge ruling 
on a motion for a new trial, the authority to employ subjective, rather 
than objective, factors will make it easier for judges who are experienc-
ing tunnel vision to rationalize their decisions. Thus, any decision on a 
recantation that hinges almost exclusively on witness demeanor, specu-
lative allegations of duress or coercion, speculations about relation-
ships, or misstatements of the evidence should raise alarm bells. The 
problem of tunnel vision does not necessarily undercut the legitimacy 
of those reasons, but it should raise a red flag in those cases where a 
court seems to be relying only on subjective judgments or speculations. 
B. Incentivizing Witnesses Creates Strong Motivations to Lie 
 In 1985, Jerry Watkins was convicted by an Indiana jury of the 
murder of an eleven year-old girl based on circumstantial evidence 
and the testimony of a jailhouse informant.88 Among the witnesses to 
testify against Watkins was Dennis Ackaret, who had a long history as 
an informant in Florida and Indiana, testifying in exchange for both 
cash and lighter sentences in many cases.89 Ackaret said at trial that 
Watkins had confessed to him when they were briefly in a holding cell 
together.90 In 1987, however, Ackaret swore in a court filing in his own 
case that he had learned details of the crime not from Watkins, but 
from investigators, who showed him pictures of the murder victim and 
took him to the crime scene.91 In 1988, Watkins produced witnesses 
who testified that Ackaret had admitted his lies to them.92 The Indi-
ana Court of Appeals found that there was substantial evidence 
against Ackaret and that the witnesses he had produced were cumula-
tive of other evidence produced at trial.93 
 In 2000, in the wake of exonerating DNA evidence, the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana remanded 
Watkins’ case for a new trial.94 Notably, in the wake of the DNA exonera-
                                                                                                                      
86 See supra notes 42–64 and accompanying text. 
87 516 N.E.2d at 720–22. 
88 Watkins v. State, 528 N.E.2d 456, 457, 460 (Ind. 1988). 
89 Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 834 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
90 Id. at 828. 
91 Id. at 830. 
92 Watkins v. State, 528 N.E.2d at 458. 
93 See Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 827. 
94 Id. at 857. 
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tion, even the remanding court found that “there is ample reason to be 
skeptical about Ackeret’s motion that effectively recants his trial testi-
mony” because the motion “reflects his selfish motives to lie against the 
police and prosecution.”95 Watkins ultimately was released from prison 
in 2000, thirteen years after Ackaret’s recantation.96 Without the DNA 
evidence in this case, the courts would have continued to believe in the 
truth of Ackaret’s trial testimony and in the falsity of his recantation. 
 Watkins’ case and a host of other DNA cases have proven that jail-
house informants, accomplices, and others who testify in exchange for 
reduced sentences are particularly untrustworthy.97 Indeed, such testi-
mony was involved in 45.9% of the first 111 death row exonerations 
since 1970.98 The causes of such unreliability are not hard to fathom: 
simply put, “when the criminal justice system offers witnesses incentives 
to lie, they will.”99 The incentives for providing false testimony are pow-
erful, whether the informant is either already in jail, a co-defendant, or 
an acquaintance of a defendant with pending charges.100 Anyone in 
that situation knows that providing information about a defendant can 
result in a much-reduced sentence or dropped charges.101 Even worse, 
the most famous informant of all, Leslie Vernon White, explained that 
providing false testimony as an informant is not difficult—he provided 
                                                                                                                      
95 Id. at 854. 
96 Terry Horne, 14 Years Later, DNA Results Aid Inmate’s Release, Indianapolis Star, July 
22, 2000, at A1. 
97 See Rob Warden, The Snitch System: How Snitch Testimony Sent Randy Steidl 
and Other Innocent Americans to Death Row 3 (2004), available at http://www.law.north- 
western.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/causesandremedies/snitches/SnitchSystemBooklet.pdf  
(documenting that the testimony of incentivized witnesses is the leading cause of wrongful con-
victions in capital cases). 
98 Warden, supra note 97, at 3. Incentivized testimony is the number one cause of 
wrongful convictions in capital cases, most of which do not involve DNA evidence. Id. at 3, 
14. This dearth of DNA evidence exists because “the typical capital crime in this country is 
not a rape murder, but a murder in the course of robbery or burglary, or for insurance or 
hire, and these offenses are only infrequently characterized by biological evidence left by 
the offender.” James S. Liebman, The New Death Penalty Debate: What’s DNA Got to Do with It?, 
33 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 527, 541–42 (2002). Typical capital crime cases are less likely 
to involve eyewitnesses than rape cases, and the exonerations therefore are more likely to 
involve a confession by the real perpetrator, a recantation, defects in other forensic evi-
dence, or proof of an ironclad alibi. Id. at 542. 
99 Warden, supra note 97, at 2. 
100 Dwyer et al., supra note 5, at 128–29 (detailing how snitches concocted false con-
fessions in return for jail release or extra privileges in jail); Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond 
Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 37 Golden Gate U. L. Rev. 107, 
108 (2006) (“Informants lie primarily in exchange for lenience for their own crimes, al-
though sometimes they lie for money.”). 
101 See Dwyer et al., supra note 5, at 128–29; Natapoff, supra note 100, at 108. 
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false information in three murder cases in a thirty-six day period and 
even demonstrated for police that he could use a phone to obtain 
enough false information to testify against someone in a twenty-minute 
period.102 
 In recent years, the practice of rewarding informants has become 
more pronounced and more entrenched in the justice system.103 Alex-
andra Natapoff traces this rise to three factors: (1) the U. S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, which make cooperation with authorities the main way to 
receive leniency; (2) mandatory minimum sentences, in which only 
cooperation allows courts to depart from high sentencing require-
ments; and (3) the growth of drug crime enforcement efforts, in which 
officers need informants to solve their cases.104 As a result, the justice 
system has become increasingly dependent on such implausible in-
credible testimony, with police and prosecutors coming to rely very 
heavily on informants as their only evidence in some cases.105 Even 
though informant testimony is often the only evidence in a case, police 
and prosecutors cannot always and do not always rigorously check 
statements provided by their informants.106 Thus, as Natapoff writes, 
“[t]his gives rise to a disturbing marriage of convenience: both snitches 
and the government benefit from inculpatory information while nei-
ther has a strong incentive to challenge it.”107 
 For the most part, the reaction to this problem has been to sug-
gest reforms that would mitigate the problem of false informant tes-
timony.108 This is as it should be. Yet the problem of informant testi-
mony also has important implications in cases involving recantations. 
The reforms suggested to eradicate the problems associated with in-
                                                                                                                      
102 See Dwyer et al., supra note 5, at 127. 
103 Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. 
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who cooperate receive leniency. Id. at 657; see also N. Mariana Islands v. Bowie, 243 F.3d 
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104 Natapoff, supra note 103, at 655. 
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106 Natapoff, supra note 100, at 108. 
107 Id. 
108 See, e.g., id. at 112–29 (proposing establishment of pre-trial reliability hearings for 
snitch testimonies). 
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formant testimony before trial do not address these implications. Re-
cantations by incentivized witnesses are quite common, but as Watkins 
illustrates, courts that rely frequently on the testimony of informants 
are reluctant to believe those same witnesses when they recant.109 
Courts in these cases are particularly leery of recanting informants 
trying to manipulate the courts, an understandable fear.110 That fear, 
however, needs to be balanced with the inherent problems posed by 
incentivized testimony. DNA exonerations have proven how unreli-
able incentivized testimony can be, so courts should begin to balance 
that with their concerns about manipulation. 
C. Witness Coercion Is Not Limited to Defendants 
 In 1978, a young man and his fiancée were abducted from the 
Homewood, Illinois, gas station at which he was employed.111 They 
were taken to an abandoned apartment in East Chicago Heights, Illi-
nois, where she was raped and killed; the man was taken to a nearby 
field where he was shot to death.112 Police quickly focused their atten-
tion on the Ford Heights Four—Kenneth Adams, Verneal Jimerson, 
Willie Rainge, and Dennis Williams, four young men who lived near 
the crime scene.113 Shortly after the crime and the first arrests, police 
interviewed Paula Gray, a mentally retarded seventeen-year-old with a 
ninth grade education.114 Gray told police she had gone to the mur-
der scene, where she saw the four men perpetrating the crime.115 She 
said they would not let her leave the scene, gave her a lighter to hold 
for them, and raped the female victim while she watched.116 Gray then 
observed the men kill the male victim.117 Gray testified to this effect 
before the grand jury but recanted her testimony at a preliminary 
hearing in the case, which forced the state to drop charges against 
one of the men and led them to charge her with perjury.118 
                                                                                                                      
109 See 92 F. Supp. 2d at 854. 
110 See, e.g., State v. Soto, No. 03-3446, 2005 WL 524874, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 
2005). 
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 Gray’s perjury case ultimately was reversed, because her attorney 
was found to have a conflict of interest.119 When her case was re-
manded, she changed her story again, agreeing to testify against the 
men in exchange for time served.120 When defense investigators in-
terviewed Gray, she told them her statement had been coerced by po-
lice.121 Her recantation was proven true when DNA testing exoner-
ated all of the men.122 
 Although it seems counterintuitive, Gray’s case is not an anomaly. 
One of the most surprising revelations of the DNA revolution has been 
the number of wrongfully convicted defendants who falsely confessed 
to committing crimes.123 Most of those defendants have only implicated 
themselves, but there have been multiple co-defendants who have 
falsely confessed by implicating themselves and their co-defendants.124 
While this might sound like incentivized testimony, the testimony de-
tailed in this section is more commonly thought to be obtained as a re-
sult of coercive interrogation tactics than by a calculated desire to re-
ceive a lower sentence.125 A host of psychological factors can cause 
individuals to confess to crimes they did not commit, because interro-
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Statesman, Dec. 22, 2000, at A1. Aside from the Ford Heights Four case, another example 
of a false confession implicating co-defendants took place when a man, Chris Ochoa, 
falsely confessed to a rape and murder and implicated another man, Richard Danziger, in 
the process. Id. In another case, two men falsely confessed to murdering a graduate stu-
dent in Chicago, implicating two other co-defendants in the process. Maurice Possley & 
Steve Mills, Governor Pardons Roscetti 4, Chi. Trib., Oct. 17, 2002, § 1, at 1. In each of these 
cases, DNA testing ultimately exonerated the defendants. Copelin & Hafetz, supra; Possley 
& Mills, supra. 
125 Drizin & Leo, supra note 123, at 911 (explaining that “[t]he purpose of interroga-
tion is not to determine whether a suspect is guilty,” but to “break the anticipated resis-
tance of an individual who is presumed guilty”). Police officers interrogate reluctant wit-
nesses the same way they do suspects. Jim Trainum, Detective, Metro. Police Dep’t, 
Presentation to Wrongful Convictions Class at American University’s Washington College 
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gation tactics lead them to believe that confessing is a logical choice.126 
These interrogation methods are capable of eliciting confessions from 
the innocent, particularly from young, mentally impaired defendants, 
but also from defendants with no impairments at all.127 
  This phenomenon calls into question several of the reasons 
enumerated by courts for their failure to find credible the recantations 
of witnesses. First, not all recanting co-defendants are simply trying to 
manipulate the system.128 Some of them, like Gray, have genuinely 
been coerced and have attacks of conscience.129 Second, and perhaps 
more significantly, defendants are not the only parties in the criminal 
justice system who coerce statements out of witnesses.130 Courts tend to 
presume that witnesses recant because they are coerced, but they ne-
glect to consider the possibility, and even dismiss the possibility, that 
police or prosecutors also use improper tactics to elicit witness state-
ments.131 Thus, recantations that allege such tactics frequently are 
deemed unbelievable, oftentimes because they allege such tactics.132 
Although there certainly are frivolous allegations of improper police 
tactics, the problem of false confessions and documented use of im-
proper interrogation techniques in dozens of cases should change the 
calculus of courts as they examine recantations that are coupled with 
allegations of coercion.133 Taking those claims seriously, rather than 
                                                                                                                      
126 Drizin & Leo, supra note 123, at 913 (“[T]he interrogator’s goal is to persuade the 
suspect that the act of admission is in his self-interest and therefore the most rational 
course of action, just as the act of continued denial is against his self-interest and therefore 
the least rational course of action.”). 
127 See Boaz Sangero, Miranda is Not Enough: A New Justification for Demanding “Strong 
Corroboration” to a Confession, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2791, 2793–94 (2007) (“In a considerable 
number of [DNA exoneration] cases . . .convictions were based solely on the false confes-
sions of defendants, which had been extracted by police interrogators.”). 
128 See supra notes 111–127 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra notes 111–127 and accompanying text. 
130 See supra notes 111–127 and accompanying text. 
131 See, e.g., Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 854 (finding incredible the recanting in-
formant’s assertion that investigators took him to the crime scene and fed him details 
about the crime); Lewis v. State, 111 P.3d 636, 651 (Kan. Ct. App. 2003) (per curiam) (af-
firming the trial court’s finding that victim’s recantation did not merit a new trial, despite 
her assertion that the prosecutor told her to lie). 
132 See Gray, 721 F.2d at 592–94; Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d at 854; Lewis, 111 P.3d 
at 650–51. In Paula Gray’s case, the trial court and appellate court both found incredible 
her assertion that her confession had been coerced. Gray, 721 F.2d at 592–94. 
133 See generally Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, The Consequences of False Confessions: 
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. 
Crim. L. & Criminology 429, 435 (1998) (analyzing likelihood of “police-induced false 
confessions . . . to lead to the wrongful arrest, prosecution, conviction incarceration of the 
innocent”). 
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discounting them outright, will lead to a more balanced examination 
of witness recantations. 
D. Observations About Witness Demeanor Are Not Always Accurate 
 In 1999, Clarence Elkins was convicted of murdering his mother-
in-law and raping his six-year-old niece.134 The niece unhesitatingly 
identified him at trial, pointing him out in the courtroom.135 A few 
years later, the child admitted to her mother that she thought the as-
sailant and Elkins had different eyes.136 In 2002, the child recanted 
her testimony to a defense investigator,137 and Elkins filed a motion 
for a new trial.138 The court was presented with a videotaped deposi-
tion of the child recanting her testimony, but the judge found that the 
recantation lacked credibility.139 Specifically, he found that she re-
canted under significant pressure from her family and that “during 
the deposition [in which she recanted on video], the child was hesi-
tant and seemed unsure of her answers.”140 He contrasted this to her 
confident testimony at trial.141 In short, he found that her demeanor 
at trial was much more consistent with a witness telling the truth than 
her demeanor in the video deposition.142 Unfortunately for Elkins, 
the victim’s recantation actually was the truth, which was proven when 
DNA testing exonerated Elkins in 2005.143 
 The Elkins case, as well as the Dotson case, demonstrates that trial 
judges are not always adept at judging the demeanor of recanting wit-
nesses, even though they frequently find that recanting witnesses are 
incredible based on assessments of demeanor.144 This is not surpris-
ing. In his article on evaluating witness credibility, Steven I. Friedland 
explains that laypersons rarely are able to assess accurately witness 
                                                                                                                      
134 Laura A. Bischoff & Mary McCarty, ‘My God, This Thing Is Horrifying’, Dayton Daily 
News, Aug. 8, 2006, at A6. 
135 State v. Elkins, No. 21380, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4037, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 
27, 2003). 
136 Bischoff & McCarty, supra note 134. 
137 Id. 
138 Elkins, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4037, at *2. 
139 Id. at *10–14. 
140 Id. at *10, 12. 
141 See id. at *12. 
142 See id. at *13–14. 
143 See Bischoff & McCarty, supra note 134. 
144 See Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 721–22; Elkins, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4037, at *2. 
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credibility.145 Instead, psychological studies have found that “[g]iven 
the complexity and subtlety of . . . nonverbal cues, an untrained ob-
server, such as a juror, has ‘probably . . . no better than chance’ to as-
sess accurately sincerity from nonverbal action.”146 Friedland primarily 
addresses the inability of jurors to assess the sincerity of witnesses, ar-
guing that defendants should be permitted to introduce expert testi-
mony on the credibility of witnesses, whether those witnesses are eye-
witnesses or sexual assault victims.147 However, his argument is 
applicable to judges; like jurors, judges can lack the expertise of psy-
chologists to assess accurately witness credibility. Indeed, the Elkins 
and Dotson cases are proof that in some cases, judges can be wrong in 
their assessments of witness demeanor.148 Those cases are proof that 
the oft-cited problem of witness demeanor may not always be a per-
suasive reason to dismiss the credibility of a recantation. 
IV. A New Standard for Evaluating Recantations 
 The DNA revolution has called into question the factors relied 
upon by judges to dispute the reliability of nearly all recantations. The 
current standards used by courts to determine whether a defendant is 
entitled to a new trial, coupled with those outdated notions of witness 
unreliability, allow judges to dismiss requests for new trials with very 
little scrutiny in nearly every case. An effective solution to this prob-
lem will not simply call on courts to grant new trials in every case in 
which there is a recantation. That remedy would swing the pendulum 
too far and would not be a palatable result for most courts. Rather, 
the solution needs to balance the legitimate concerns about recanta-
tions with the lessons learned from DNA exonerations. 
 This article proposes two changes—both endorsed by state su-
preme courts—that will more effectively balance the interests of de-
fendants with the interests of the courts. First, courts should adopt a 
modified version of the Larrison standard that requires corroboration 
rather than proof of truth.149 As styled by the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court, corroboration would be a much more relaxed requirement 
                                                                                                                      
145 See Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 165, 178 (1990) (explaining that “common sense-based beliefs about 
witnesses are deficient”). 
146 Id. at 185. 
147 See id. at 222–24. 
148 See Dotson, 516 N.E.2d at 721–22; Elkins, 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 4037, at *2. 
149 See Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82, 88–89 (7th Cir. 1928). 
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than currently exists in most state courts.150 Second, appellate courts 
should not apply a deferential standard of review to summary denial 
of motions for new trials based on recantations. 
 Neither of these changes would radically alter the formulations 
used by most courts, and their adoption by other state supreme courts 
makes clear that the burdens they impose would not be particularly 
onerous. Thus, they offer practical solutions to a problem that will 
only grow more pronounced as the number of DNA exonerations 
continues to prove that wrongful convictions happen on a more con-
sistent basis than anyone ever believed. 
A. Adoption of a Modified Larrison Standard 
 The first element of this new framework would be courts adopt-
ing a modified version of the Larrison test, one that abandons the 
truthfulness requirement.151 As an initial matter, the materiality stan-
dard of the Larrison test is preferable, largely because the strong ma-
teriality requirement of the Berry test invites courts to look at truth as 
an element.152 Thus, a wholesale abandonment of the truthfulness 
requirement requires courts to adopt the Larrison standard rather 
than the Berry standard. 
 The genesis of the truthfulness requirement makes some sense— 
granting new trials in cases with obviously false recantations would be 
unwise for many reasons. However, as evidenced in the Dotson, Watkins, 
Elkins, and Ford Heights Four cases, the recanting witnesses were testi-
fying about events or conversations in which only the witness and the 
defendant knew the truth.153 In those scenarios, proving the absolute 
truth of the recantation or absolute falsity of the trial testimony was vir-
tually impossible until each defendant could use DNA evidence.154 The 
simple explanation for this is that when only the witness knows the real 
                                                                                                                      
150 See State v. McCallum, 561 N.W.2d 707, 711–12 (Wis. 1997) (requiring recantations 
be corroborated by new evidence rather than meet a truthfulness requirement). 
151 See id. 
152 See Berry v. State, 10 Ga. 511, 527 (1851); In re Carpitcher, 624 S.E.2d 700, 707 (Va. 
Ct. App. 2006) (holding that the defendant must prove the truth of the recantation or the 
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154 See Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational Versus 
Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 11–12 (2007) (“If the 
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truth, the courts essentially are forced to guess based on credibility 
judgments and other subjective factors. Thus, a new formulation of this 
standard is necessary to balance the interests in judicial economy with 
the reality that discerning truth based on witness demeanor is incredi-
bly difficult. 
 Advocates for the wrongfully convicted are not the only people to 
have noticed the problems inherent in a truth requirement. Instead of 
requiring the defendant to prove the truth of the allegation, the Wis-
consin Supreme Court requires the defendant to corroborate the re-
cantation with other newly discovered evidence of innocence.155 A cor-
roboration requirement could be a wolf in sheep’s clothing, a truth 
requirement that simply is called by a different name. However, the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court has recognized that “requiring a defendant 
to redress a false allegation with significant independent corroboration 
of the falsity would place an impossible burden upon any wrongly ac-
cused defendant.”156 Thus, the court has found that “a feasible motive 
for the initial false statement” and “circumstantial guarantees of the 
trustworthiness of the recantation” meet the corroboration require-
ment.157 Adopting such a requirement would enable defendants trying 
to prove the truth of a recantation in difficult circumstances to argue 
that various indicia of reliability make the recantation more credible. 
 The first element of Wisconsin’s relaxed corroboration require-
ment is evidence of a feasible motive for providing false testimony at 
trial.158 In McCallum, the court found that a feasible motive to falsify 
allegations existed.159 The child victim “wanted her divorcing parents 
to reconcile,” “resented [the defendant] McCallum for attempting to 
take the place of her father,” and “was angry at McCallum for disci-
plining her.”160 In contrast, the Virginia courts discounted evidence of 
motive in the Carpitcher case, in part because Virginia has a truth re-
                                                                                                                      
155 See McCallum, 561 N.W.2d at 711–12. The Wisconsin court adopted the corrobora-
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quirement.161 Under the formulation recommended in this article, 
either the desire to receive a more favorable sentence or coercion by 
police also would constitute a feasible motive to testify falsely at trial. 
This modification could change the way courts treat recantations in 
situations like the Watkins case and the Ford Heights Four case, thus 
leveling the playing field for defendants attempting to win new trials 
based on recantation evidence.162 
 The second element of Wisconsin’s corroboration requirement is 
circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.163 The Wisconsin courts 
have found that: 
Assurances of trustworthiness can include the spontaneity of 
the statement, whether the statement is corroborated by other 
evidence in the case, the extent to which the statement is self-
incriminatory and against the penal interest of the declarant, 
and the declarant’s availability to testify under oath and sub-
ject to cross-examination.164 
 The determination of credibility is not limited to those factors, 
leaving the door open for considering other indicia of reliability not 
listed by the court.165 Thus, under the formulation recommended in 
this article, courts also should consider whether the type of evidence 
(such as incentivized testimony) has been proven to be untrustworthy 
in other contexts, whether the witness might be someone who could 
be subject to coercion, and whether the law enforcement personnel 
involved have coerced statements in the past. The DNA exonerations 
have proven that each of these factors could be present in a given case 
and may indicate the reliability of a recanting statement. If courts be-
gin to objectively consider reliability both in the traditional context 
articulated by the Wisconsin courts and in the context of what we now 
know about the fallibility of the justice system, the decisions they 
                                                                                                                      
161 See In re Carpitcher, 624 S.E.2d at 709 (“Although [the witness] had an alleged mo-
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reach are likely to be fairer and to balance more appropriately the 
interests of defendants with interests of finality. 
B. Deferential Review of Summary Denials Should Be Abandoned 
 The other reform that is necessary to ensure fair consideration of 
recantation testimony is that courts should adopt a less deferential 
standard of review for summary denials of new trial motions based on 
recantation testimony.166 In most cases, appellate courts reviewing de-
nials of new trial motions use an “abuse of discretion” standard, which 
is extremely deferential and gives trial judges wide latitude to deny mo-
tions without the fear of reversal.167 As Medwed argues, this system “of-
fers few incentives—and arguably provides a disincentive—for trial 
judges to do so much as hold an evidentiary hearing.”168 Thus, eviden-
tiary hearings in new trial motions are rare, particularly in recantation 
cases. 
 At least one state has correctly observed that determining the ve-
racity of a recantation is a difficult task without holding an evidentiary 
hearing.169 In McLin v. State, one of the defendant’s alleged co-
conspirators, who had testified against McLin in a pretrial deposition, 
signed an affidavit stating that McLin did not participate in the crime 
and that another man did.170 The trial court summarily denied McLin’s 
motion alleging newly discovered evidence, finding, without holding an 
evidentiary hearing, that the affidavit probably was untruthful.171 The 
appellate court said that a trial court summarily denying a motion for 
post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence must prove 
that the claim is “facially invalid” or “conclusively refuted by the re-
cord.”172 Moreover, “where no evidentiary hearing is held below, [the 
appellate court] must accept the defendant’s factual allegations to the 
extent they are not refuted by the record.”173 This standard of review is 
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much less deferential than the standard of review in cases where the 
trial court holds an evidentiary hearing.174 The court also recognized 
that in recantation cases, evidentiary hearings are usually required to 
determine whether the defendant meets the standard for a new trial.175 
 As Medwed observes, the rationale of the McLin court is quite 
sensible.176 The justification for deferential review of trial court deci-
sions is usually that trial courts—which have heard the evidence pre-
sented—have a superior grasp of the facts that cannot be matched by 
an appellate court making determinations based on a paper record.177 
When a trial court does not have that advantage because it has not 
held an evidentiary hearing, the purpose of deferential review is less 
pronounced.178 Medwed’s suggestion and the solution adopted by the 
McLin court strike an appropriate balance, ensuring fairness to de-
fendants who have not had their claims heard while addressing con-
cerns about judicial economy in cases where courts have held eviden-
tiary hearings.179 Finally, non-deferential review also will force trial 
courts to justify their decisions more thoroughly in those cases where 
they summarily deny new evidence motions based on recantations. 
 Adopting a non-deferential standard of review in these cases will 
begin to mitigate the problem of tunnel vision in recantation cases. 
Apprehension about tunnel vision should be even greater in recanta-
tion cases where judges refuse to hold evidentiary hearings, since a 
court that refuses even to listen to new evidence of innocence may be 
falling victim to the cognitive biases that infect so many participants in 
the justice system. Non-deferential review by an appellate court will en-
sure that a new set of eyes, one that is somewhat more objective, will be 
critically examining the recantation to determine whether it seems 
credible enough to warrant an evidentiary hearing or a new trial. 
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Conclusion 
 The sagas of Gary Dotson, the Ford Heights Four, Jerry Watkins, 
and Clarence Elkins are tragic stories of a criminal justice system that 
has made mistakes far more often than most people ever believed. In 
each of those cases, the defendants spent years in prison, even after re-
cantation evidence seriously undermined the credibility of the gov-
ernment’s case against them. The unfortunate reality is that those de-
fendants are among the lucky ones, because DNA evidence ultimately 
became available in their cases and conclusively proved their inno-
cence. 
 In the vast majority of recantation cases, DNA evidence never will 
be available to conclusively prove the defendant’s innocence. Under 
the current system, the Gary Dotsons of the world will remain in prison, 
even after cases like Dotson’s have proven that the standards used by 
courts to judge recantations often fail to assess credibility accurately. It 
therefore is imperative that courts act to change this scheme. While the 
reluctance of courts to grant new trials based on recantations is under-
standable, the reasons for that reluctance need to be balanced with 
what we now know about the fallibility of the criminal justice system. 
Changing the standards is possible without overburdening courts, and 
such change is necessary to address the injustices suffered by innocent 
defendants who have no other way to prove their innocence. 
